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People often use spatial metaphors (e.g., think “laterally,” “outside the box”) to describe explo-
ration of the problem space during creative problem solving. In this paper, we probe the 
potential cognitive underpinnings of these spatial metaphors. Drawing on theories of situ-
ative cognition, semantic foraging theory, and environmental psychology, we formulate and 
test the hypothesis that larger physical spaces can facilitate divergent (but not convergent) 
processes in problem space exploration. Across two experiments, participants worked on 
a battery of problem solving tasks intended to represent divergent (alternative uses, shape 
invention) and convergent (remote associates, letter extrapolation) problem solving processes 
in either a large or a small room. In Experiment 1, participants in the larger room produced 
more novel alternative uses for everyday objects, and created more novel shape inventions, 
but generated less practical alternative uses, than participants in the smaller room. In Experi-
ment 2, participants in the larger room (including a variant larger room) also produced more 
novel alternative uses for everyday objects, and less practical alternative uses, than partici-
pants in a small room, but did not create more novel shape inventions. These results sug-
gest that spatial metaphors for problem space exploration may reflect meaningful cognitive 
phenomena: People may be able to search more broadly in a problem space if they are in an 
environment where broad physical search is a salient affordance; however, this effect appears 
to be relatively small and may depend on having sufficiently motivated participants.
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INTRODUCTION
A key component of creative problem solving is exploration of 
the problem space. The problem space is typically described 
as the mental representation of the problem, including the 
initial problem description, goal, and operators (i.e., strate-
gies) to move from the initial state to the goal state (Newell & 
Simon, 1972). Theories of creative problem solving posit that 
the effective initial exploration of the problem space—some-
times called “divergence” or “divergent thinking” (Guilford, 
1956)—is critical to produce a successful solution (Amabile, 
1983; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1996; Sawyer, 2012; Simonton, 
2011; Wallas, 1926; Warr & O’Neill, 2005). Effective problem 
space exploration can be supported by considering many dif-
ferent solution approaches (Adánez, 2005; Chan et al., 2011; 
Parnes & Meadow, 1959; Shah, Millsap, Woodward, & Smith, 
2012; Torrance, 1988), increasing the variance in the quality 
of solutions considered (e.g., being willing to consider “wild” 
ideas; Chan et al., 2011; Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2010; 
Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009), considering solutions and perspec-
tives from outside one’s discipline or problem domain (Chan 
et al., 2011; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Ward, 1998), relaxing 
inferred constraints about the problem description (Knoblich, 
Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Ohlsson, 1992), and explor-
ing alternative conceptualizations of the problem (Kaplan & 
Simon, 1990; MacGregor & Cunningham, 2009). Divergence 
can also be facilitated by modulation of attention: For example, 
a reduction of attentional control or focus has been identified 
as a key mechanism for achieving divergent thinking and mak-
ing remote associations in creative problem solving (Aiello, 
Jarosz, Cushen, & Wiley, 2012; Haarmann, George, Smaliy, & 
Dien, 2012; Martindale, 1997; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012).
Successful exploration is often described with spatial lan-
guage and imagery. For example, people commonly encour-
age one another to think “laterally,” not “vertically” (Bono, 
1970), and “outside the box,” or to explore “broadly” (Wiley, 
1998) and make “remote” associations in semantic memory 
(Mednick, 1962). In this paper, our goal is to probe the poten-
tial cognitive underpinnings of these spatial metaphors. Are 
these metaphors arbitrary, or merely artifacts of human 
convention? Or do they identify real cognitive phenomena? 
Could embodying variations in these spatial metaphors (e.g., 
large vs. small physical environments) influence the nature 
of people’s search patterns in semantic space?
The present investigation is inspired by a growing body 
of literature across a diverse range of tasks that suggests that 
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people’s embodied physical context can have significant impli-
cations for information processing. For example, people per-
ceive slopes as steeper if they wear a heavy vs. a light backpack 
(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), can transfer knowledge and skills 
across contexts when there is high interconnectedness across 
activities and practices in those contexts (Brown, Collins, & 
Duguid, 1989), and make more “holistic” decisions (i.e., inte-
grating multiple sources of data and abstraction) in rooms 
with higher vs. lower ceilings (Meyers-Levy & Zhu, 2007). 
The literature provides two potential theoretical motivations 
for suspecting that the spatial metaphors of creative search 
have grounding in cognitive phenomena. The first account, 
which we call “direct priming,” is exemplified by Hills and col-
leagues’ argument that goal-directed search for resources in 
external spaces and search for resources in internal spaces (e.g., 
semantic memory) share a common neural substrate (Hills, 
2006; Hills, Jones, & Todd, 2012; Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 
2008). Specifically, that they share dopaminergic modulation 
of area-restricted search such that search is narrow in situa-
tions where the target resources have been frequently found 
in the past and search becomes broad in situations where the 
target resources are encountered less frequently. One intrigu-
ing implication of this argument is that expectations about the 
structure of search environments in external spaces can shape 
search patterns in internal spaces, or vice versa. 
To test this implication, Hills et al. (2008) studied how 
search patterns on an anagram task (i.e., search for as many 
words as possible for a given letter set) might be shaped by 
prior experience with a spatial foraging task (i.e., search for 
high-value pixels in a simple 2-D computer maze). In their 
experiment, participants completed spatial foraging tasks 
with either “clumpy”—many pixels concentrated in a few 
patches—or “diffuse”—pixels evenly distributed in the envi-
ronment—resource distributions, and subsequently tried to 
find as many anagrams as they could. They found that par-
ticipants who had just experienced a “clumpy” distribution of 
pixels took longer to switch between letter sets when search-
ing for anagrams, consistent with expectations for a “clumpy” 
distribution of anagrams (i.e., expecting letter sets to contain 
more anagrams. They inferred from this that the distribution 
of resources in the spatial environment primed expectations 
for the distribution of “resources” in the semantic space. This 
analysis suggests that the affordances in the external, physical 
environment (e.g., the distribution of resources) may shape 
the mind’s internal search in semantic space. 
Following this line of thought, we reason that, to the extent 
that large physical environments afford free movement and 
exploration, they may also better facilitate divergent problem 
solving (i.e., exploration of semantic space) relative to smaller, 
constrained spaces. Rather than simply fostering increased 
performance via increased effort, people might be sensitive 
to how larger physical spaces afford freer exploration, and 
consequently adopt a semantic search strategy that better 
matches this resource distribution, such as by relaxing their 
focus of attention from more clearly relevant or high-quality 
responses to more semantically distant and varied (and likely 
more novel) associations (Aiello et al., 2012; Haarmann et al., 
2012; Martindale, 1997; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). This direct 
priming of attentional focus might occur without conscious 
awareness, similar to some varieties of top-down modulation 
of visual attention (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). This direct prim-
ing mechanism can also be related to the notion of “frames” 
in research on situative cognition, for example, expectations 
(whether explicit or tacit) about a given situation that are influ-
enced by the affordances and constraints of particular environ-
ments, and go to shape cognition and interaction (Goffman, 
1974; Greeno, 1994; Greeno & Middle-School Mathemat-
ics through Applications Project Group, 1998; Maclachlan & 
Reid, 1994; Nokes-Malach & Mestre, 2013; Scherr & Hammer, 
2009). Because both varieties of direct priming mechanisms 
can occur without conscious awareness, we do not expect 
facilitation of divergent performance to be associated with 
more effortful performance. Indeed, to the extent that people 
relax their focus of attention to search more broadly, we might 
even expect to see a decreased perception of task difficulty as 
measured by cognitive load (e.g., Antonenko, Paas, Grabner, & 
Gog, 2010; Chandler & Sweller, 1991).
The second line of reasoning, which we call the “concept 
activation” account, comes from research in environmental 
psychology that explores how certain configurations of physical 
environments can prime certain psychological states or ideas, 
which can then influence later information processing. For 
example, Hall (1966) argues that small and contained spaces 
(e.g., chapels) can evoke notions of confinement or restricted-
ness, while larger spaces (e.g., cathedrals) can prime notions 
of freedom and openness. Similarly, Moore, Lane, Hill, Cohen, 
and McGinty (1994) suggest that lower ceilings may invoke 
more restricted play, while higher ceilings may encourage 
“freer” play. In the Meyers-Levy and Zhu (2007) study men-
tioned previously, the effect of the ceiling height manipulation 
on decision making was mediated by activation of the concept 
of “freedom” vs. “confinement.” This line of reasoning presents 
an indirect mechanism by which larger spaces prime concepts 
of “freedom” and “broadness,” which in turn induces infor-
mation processing that is also “less constrained,” for example, 
more holistic, as in Meyers-Levy & Zhu (2007), thereby facili-
tating divergent processing during problem solving. 
In contrast to the direct priming account, concept activa-
tion may also be marked by affective changes (e.g., increases 
in positive affect, decreases in negative affect), since concepts 
related to “freedom” may have positive valence, while con-
cepts related to “confinement” may have negative valence. 
For example, a recent affective norming project found that 
the word “freedom” had a highly positive valence score of 
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7.72 on a 1 to 9 valence scale (1 is highly negative, 9 is highly 
positive), while the word “restrict” had a much more nega-
tive valence of 3.48 out of 9 (Warriner, Kuperman, & Brys-
baert, 2013). Therefore, measuring changes in affect may 
be a way to distinguish between direct priming or concept 
activation accounts of potential associations between physi-
cal surroundings and divergent/convergent problem solving 
processes: Increased divergent performance in large physi-
cal spaces accompanied by increases in positive affect (and 
decreases in negative affect) would be more consistent with 
a concept activation account of the cognitive basis of spatial 
imagery for divergent exploration.
Synthesizing these ideas, we test the hypothesis that larger 
spaces will have a facilitation effect on divergent problem 
solving processes (i.e., processes that have similar cognitive 
characteristics to the exploration stage of the creative pro-
cess), but not “convergent” problem solving processes (i.e., 
processes that focus on “converging” on a single “correct” or 
canonical answer). To the extent that increased divergence 
may be at odds with convergent processes (Goldenberg, Lar-
son, & Wiley, 2013), larger spaces might also hinder con-
vergent problem solving. We further hypothesize that this 
facilitation would be accompanied by decreases in perceived 
task difficulty. Measures of affect might help distinguish 
between the direct priming and concept activation expla-
nations of observed effects. In summary, in this paper, we 
examine the following three main hypotheses.
H1: Divergent performance will be higher in larger vs.   
        smaller physical spaces.
H2: Convergent performance will be lower in larger vs.
        smaller physical spaces.
H3: Perceived task difficulty for divergent tasks will be    
        lower in larger vs. smaller physical spaces.
We conducted two experiments to test these hypotheses, 
first with a sample of paid volunteers, and then with a larger 
sample of psychology subject pool participants and an expan-
sion of the range of physical spaces and problem solving stimuli 
that are tested. To preview our results, we find partial support 
for the first two hypotheses across both experiments, and find 
that these effects are not associated with changes in affect.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this study, we provide a first test of the three hypotheses. 
The basic experimental approach is to have participants work 
on a battery of problem solving tasks intended to represent 
both divergent and convergent processing in either large or 
small rooms. As noted, our hypotheses are that divergent 
problem solving performance will be facilitated by being in a 
large (vs. small) room, while convergent performance will be 
hindered by being in the large room.
METhODs
Participants
Forty-seven people (20 males, 27 females; ages 19–66, average 
age 27) from the community at a large research university in the 
northeastern United States participated in this study. Thirty-five 
of the participants were undergraduate or graduate students at 
the university. Most of the other participants were recent gradu-
ates or employees of the university or businesses on campus. All 
participants were recruited through fliers posted around cam-
pus and were compensated 10 dollars for their time.
Four participants didn’t produce valid data on one of the 
problem solving tasks (3 did not produce any valid inven-
tions, and 1 did not produce any valid uses), and were there-
fore dropped from our analyses: There were two each from 
the large and small rooms respectively.1 Therefore, our final 
dataset consisted of 43 participants.
Materials
Room size manipulation. To manipulate room size, we had partici-
pants complete their problem solving tasks in one of two rooms 
on campus. The “large” room was a conference auditorium (see 
Fig 1, left panel). The dimensions of the room were approximately 
15’ W × 30’ L × 15’ H. Participants completed their tasks on a 
desk in the front of the auditorium facing toward the audience 
seats so that the size of the room would be salient. Other than the 
desk and chair the participants used, and the other chairs facing 
the front of the auditorium, the auditorium was empty.
The “small” room was a former office space that was emp-
tied out for the experiment (Fig 1: next page, right panel). 
The dimensions of the room were approximately 8’ W × 10’ 
L × 8’ H. Participants completed their tasks on a desk facing 
one of the walls. It was empty except for the desk and chair 
the participants used.
Other than the size of the room, we made sure that the 
two rooms were similar in a number of important ways, 
including amount of stimuli encountered on the walk to the 
room (both rooms were in the same building), ambient noise 
(we chose rooms that were far from other offices in the build-
ing), and temperature (both rooms shared the same central 
air conditioning system). The one potentially salient differ-
ence was the tone of lighting: the large room used incandes-
cent lighting, while the small room used fluorescent lighting.
Problem-solving tasks
Participants completed a battery of four problem-solving 
tasks intended to represent both divergent and convergent 
processing: 1) an alternative uses task, 2) a shape invention 
task, 3) a version of the Remote Associates Test (RAT), and 4) 
a letter series extrapolation task. In this section we describe 
each task along with the hypothesized processes involved.
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Alternative uses. The alternative uses task is patterned after 
Guilford’s (1967) classic alternate uses task in which the 
problem solver is asked to list as many uses as possible for 
a common object (e.g., think of as many uses as you can 
for a brick). It has been hypothesized to measure divergent 
thinking processes because the output of the task is a range 
of responses rather than one correct or incorrect response. 
Task output is typically measured in terms of the fluency and 
flexibility (e.g., novelty) of the responses. However, this task 
may also involve convergent processes. People may initially 
think of a variety of responses, and subsequently evaluate and 
select only the uses that are both novel and practical. This 
corresponds to the selection/evaluation processes/phases in 
various theories of cognitive and creative production, such as 
the convergent production component of Guilford’s (1956) 
“structure of intellect” theory, the response validation stage of 
Amabile’s (1983) process model of creativity, and the Explore 
phase of Finke and colleagues’ (1996) Geneplore model. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that fluency and novelty are mea-
sures of divergent thinking on this task, whereas practical-
ity is a measure of convergent thinking. It is useful to note 
that convergence may not necessarily always follow diver-
gence: Convergence can also reflect attentional focus on 
and rapid selection of the most readily accessible responses, 
which are often the most successful or appropriate (Bilalić, 
McLeod, & Gobet, 2008; Guilford, 1956; Luchins, 1942).
We used “SHOE” and “NEWSPAPER” as our common 
object items and gave the following instructions to partici-
pants: “In this part of the experiment, your task is to list as 
many uses as you can for an object (named below). For exam-
ple, if the object is ‘BRICK,’ you could say ‘building material, 
doorstop, anchor, etc.’ The goal is to come up with as many 
uses of an object as possible. There are 2 of these problems, 
and you will have 4 minutes for each.”
Shape invention. In the shape invention task (Finke et al., 1996), 
the problem solver is given three three-dimensional shapes 
to combine together to create as many useful objects that 
belong to one of three given categories (e.g., toys and games, 
transportation). Similar to the alternative uses task, we 
hypothesize that this task includes elements of both diver-
gent and convergent processing. Again, we hypothesize that 
Figure 1
Picture of large room (left) and small room (right) in Experiment 1.
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the novelty of the items generated would reflect divergent 
thinking processes, whereas the practicality of the objects 
would reflect convergent processes.
Some versions of this task allow the problem solver to 
choose the shapes and/or the object categories; we elected 
to randomly select both shapes and categories and present 
them as givens for all participants. Part of the motivation for 
this was that Finke and colleagues (1996) found that this con-
dition stimulated the most creative responses, and we wanted 
to give our participants the best chance of displaying creative 
performance. Finke and colleagues’ original set of shapes 
includes 15 different shapes, ranging from spheres to cylin-
ders, to wires, wheels, and flat squares; each shape belongs 
to a subcategory set of 5 shapes, ordered by how difficult it is 
(normed from their studies) to incorporate into an invented 
object (easy, medium, and hard). We randomly sampled 
3 shapes from this list, with “easy” shapes having a probability 
= 0.10 of being selected, “medium” shapes having a probability 
= .07 of being selected, and “hard” shapes having a probabil-
ity = 0.03 of being selected. Finke and colleagues’ original 
set of object categories consisted of 8 categories: weapons, 
toys and games, appliances, transportation, scientific instru-
ments, tools and utensils, furniture, and personal items. We 
randomly selected three categories from this list to give to 
participants. We ended up with the sphere, tube, and cone 
objects (see Figure 2), and the following object categories: 
tools and utensils, toys and games, and personal items.
We gave the following instructions to participants: “In this 
part of the experiment, your task is to try to use the follow-
ing ‘parts’ to ‘construct’ as many useful objects as you can. 
These objects can be existing things or things you invent. You 
will have 8 minutes to do this. The rules for using the parts 
to construct objects are as follows: 1) you are allowed to vary 
the size, position, or orientation of any part, but you may not 
bend or deform the parts (except the tube), 2) the parts can be 
put inside one another, 3) you decide if the parts are hollow or 
solid, and 4) you decide what material the parts are made of—
they can be made of any material, including wood, metal, plas-
tic, rubber, or glass, or any combination of these materials.”
RAT. To complete the RAT (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & 
Parker, 1990; Mednick, 1962; Mednick & Mednick, 1967), 
solvers must generate a target word that is related to a list 
of three cue words. For example, a correct response for the 
cue words Elephant-Lapse-Vivid would be the target word 
“memory.” While the RAT is most commonly used as a mea-
sure of creativity (e.g., Wiley, 1998), and several prior studies 
have examined the role of divergent processes in RAT per-
formance (Aiello et al., 2012; Haarmann et al., 2012), we rea-
soned that it also heavily taps convergent processes since the 
final output is a single answer that is compared to a predeter-
mined correct answer. We are not the first to treat the RAT in 
this way: Other recent studies have also studied the RAT as 
primarily a convergent task in contrast to the alternate uses 
task (treated as primarily measuring divergent processes), 
and found both dissociable effects on these tasks from their 
manipulations and a lack of correlation between performance 
on these tasks (Colzato, Ozturk, & Hommel, 2012; Oppezzo 
& Schwartz, 2014; Radel, Davranche, Fournier, & Dietrich, 
2015). We gave participants 32 items, of varying difficulty, 
drawn from Mednick and Mednick (1967) and Bowers et al. 
(1990), chosen to reflect a range of difficulty levels. The full 
list of items can be seen in the appendix.
Letter series. In the letter series task, the problem solver is 
given a series of letters and is asked to generate additional 
letters to “N” places to complete the pattern exemplified 
in the given series. For example, given the series “aaabbbccc,” 
the correct extrapolation to N = 3 places is “ddd.” Similar 
to the RAT, this task requires the identification and genera-
tion of a single answer. Although participants may consider 
several possible patterns when solving the problem, they 
must eventually converge or decide on one to extrapolate. 
We gave participants 18 items drawn from prior studies with 
the letter series task (Nokes, 2009; Simon & Kotovsky, 1963), 
which were chosen to reflect a range of difficulty levels. The 
items had initial series ranging from 9 to 16 letters in length; 
all items required participants to extrapolate the series to N 
= 10 places. The full list of items can be seen in the appendix.
Dependent measures
In the previous section we described each task we used for 
the experiment. Some of the tasks (specifically the uses and 
invention tasks) were hypothesized to include both divergent 
and convergent processing. We now describe how we mea-
sured divergent and convergent processing across the tasks.
Divergent measures. Both the uses and invention tasks were 
scored for fluency and novelty to yield our primary diver-
gent measures. Fluency was defined as the number of uses 
or inventions generated. Novelty was rated on a scale from 
1 (not at all novel) to 4 (extremely novel). Examples of low 
and high novelty uses are “use SHOE to protect feet” and 
“use SHOE as boat for termites”; examples of low and high 
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Shapes for invention task in Experiment 1.
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novelty inventions are shown in Figure 3. Two trained coders 
evaluated the uses, with high inter-rater reliability, ICC(2,2) 
= .89. Three trained coders evaluated the inventions, with high 
inter-rater reliability, ICC(2,3) = .85. Each use/invention’s 
novelty score was the arithmetic mean of all judges’ scores for 
that use/invention. Novelty scores were then aggregated into 
participant-level measures in the following ways: mean nov-
elty (how novel their uses were, on average), and max novelty 
(what was the highest novelty score they achieved). 
Convergent measures. Both the uses and invention tasks were also 
scored for practicality, to reflect convergent processing on 
those tasks. Practicality scoring for the uses task was initially 
done with a 4-point scale (1 – unlikely to work at all, 2 – will 
work less well than conventional means, 3 – will work as well 
as conventional means, 4 – will work better than conven-
tional means), but was collapsed to a 3-point scale because 
there were almost no (agreed-upon) generated uses that war-
ranted a 4. Two trained coders evaluated the uses, with good 
inter-rater reliability, ICC(2,2) = .79. In contrast, scoring for 
the invention category had slightly higher variance, allowing 
us to code inventions on a 5-point scale (1 – extremely bad 
example of its invention category, to 5 – exceeds expectations 
for a good example of its invention category). Seven trained 
coders evaluated the inventions for practicality, with accept-
able inter-rater reliability, ICC(2,7) = .61. Examples of low 
and high practicality uses are “use SHOE as tent stake” and 
“use SHOE as slapping device to bring someone back to their 
senses”; examples of low and high practicality inventions are 
shown in Figure 3. Participant-level practicality measures 
were created by taking the arithmetic mean of practicality 
scores achieved to create a mean practicality measure for 
both uses and invention tasks, separately.
Performance on the RAT and letter series tasks were 
intended to primarily reflect convergent processing, since 
both tasks sought the production of a single “best” response. 
One trained coder scored the RAT responses as either correct 
or incorrect, using the answer key from Mednick & Mednick 
(1967) and Bowers et al. (1990). Percent correct was used 
for analysis. Letters series task performance was measured 
by marking responses as either correct or incorrect, using 
canonical answers from the prior references (Nokes, 2009; 
Simon & Kotovsky, 1963), and the percent correct was used 
for analysis.
Other measures
Perceived task difficulty. To measure perceived task difficulty, we 
adapted two items from prior research with cognitive load 
(Jang & Schunn, 2012). The measure was about the task just 
completed. The first item asked, “How easy or difficult was 
this task?” and participants were asked to answer using a 1 
to 9 scale, where 1 was anchored as “Very, very easy,” and 9 
was anchored as “Very, very difficult.” The second item asked 
“How much mental effort (e.g., searching, remembering, 
thinking, deciding) did the task take?” and participants were 
asked to answer using a 1 to 9 scale, with 1 anchored as “Very, 
very low mental effort,” and 9 anchored as “Very, very high 
mental effort.”
Positive and negative affect. To measure affect, we used the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tel-
legen, 1988), in which a subject is given 20 words that describe 
different feelings and emotions, and—using a scale of 1 (very 
slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely)—rates the extent to which 
she feels that way “right now” (i.e., at the present moment).
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Figure 3. Example of low and high novelty/practicality inventions. The low and high novelty 
inventions are a “funnel” and a device that “slows elevators with centripetal force.” The low 
and high practicality inventions are an “unstable martini glass” and a “tool to catch water to 
measure the rain.” Note that the shapes used for invention are a cone, sphere, and tube. 
Figure 3
Example of low and high novelty/practicality inventions. The low and high novelty inventions are a “funnel” and a device that 
“slows elevators with centripetal force.” The low and high practicality inventions are an “unstable martini glass” and a “tool to catch 
water to m asure the rain.” Note that the shapes used for invention are a cone, sphere, and tube.
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Procedure
Participants were greeted and brought to either the large or 
small room, depending on their assignment. They were then 
informed that they would complete four problem-solving 
tasks, grouped into two blocks with two problem sets each. 
The uses and invention tasks formed one block, while the 
RAT and letter series task formed the other block. The tasks 
were counterbalanced by block, and specific problem solving 
tasks within the block (RAT and letters; uses and invention). 
They had eight minutes to complete each problem set, and a 
one-minute warning was given before the time was up.
After each problem set, participants completed the untimed 
cognitive load survey. Before they began the problem sets, 
participants were asked to complete the first PANAS to get a 
baseline measure. They were asked to complete a second and 
third PANAS after the first and second blocks of problem sets, 
respectively. Overall, the experiment ran no longer than 45 
minutes. The experimenter remained in the room during the 
length of the experiment, seated behind the participant.
Design
This study had a between-subjects design. The independent 
variable was room size, with two levels (large or small). Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to conditions. In the final 
dataset, there were 21 participants in the large room and 22 
participants in the small room.
REsUlTs
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all problem solv-
ing measures. Table 2 shows the intercorrelations between 
participants’ problem solving task performance measures, 
collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2. In general, the correla-
tions were in the expected directions (e.g., significant positive 
correlations between divergent measures; significant positive 
correlations between letter series and RAT measures; sig-
nificant negative correlations between uses practicality and 
the divergent measures). However, the correlations are gen-
erally low, explaining small amounts of common variance, 
and some correlations are missing (e.g., no significant cor-
relations between practicality and the letters series and RAT 
measures, and no significant correlations between invention 
practicality and any of the other measures). This suggests 
that the measures do not necessarily primarily reflect the two 
constructs of divergence and convergence (as we had hypoth-
esized). Therefore, we analyze each measure separately.
Alternative uses
There was an effect of room size on mean fluency, with par-
ticipants in the large room generating more uses (M = 25.0, SE 
= 1.8) than participants in the small room (M = 19.3, SE = 1.8), 
d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.03, 1.33], F(1,41) = 5.0, p = .03. There was 
also an effect of room size on mean novelty, with participants 
in the large room producing higher mean novelty with their 
uses (M = 1.8, SE = .09) than those in the small room (M = 1.5, 
SE = .08), d = 0.78 [0.13, 1.44], F(1,41) = 6.6, p = .01 (Fig. 4, left 
panel). The results were similar for max novelty: Participants in 
the large room achieved marginally higher max novelty scores (M 
= 3.4, SE = .19) than those in the small room (M = 2.9, SE = .18), 
d = 0.61 [-0.04, 1.26], F(1,41) = 4.0, p = .05 (Fig. 4, middle panel).
In contrast, participants in the large room generated alter-
native uses that were significantly less practical (M = 2.5, SE 
= .04) than those from the small room (M = 2.7, SE = .04), d 
= –1.00 [-1.68, -0.33], F(1,41) = 10.9, p = .00 (Fig. 4, right panel).
Shape invention
Participants in the large room generated slightly more inven-
tions (M = 5.5, SE = .42) than participants in the small room (M 
= 4.6, SE = .41), d = 0.47 [-0.17, 1.11], but this difference was not 
statistically significant, F(1,41) = 2.3, p = .13. However, there 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1.
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the intercorrelations between participants’ problem solving task performance measures, collapsed 
across Experiments 1 and 2. In general, the correlations were in the expected directions (e.g., 
significant positive correlations between divergent measures; significant positive correlations 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for experiment 1. 
  Mean Median Min Max SE 
Divergent measures      
 Uses fluency 22.07 21 7 42 1.32 
 Uses novelty mean 1.67 1.59 1 2.58 0.06 
 Uses novelty max 3.12 3 1 4 0.13 
 Invention fluency 5.07 5 2 9 0.29 
 Invention novelty mean 2.74 2.83 1.56 3.83 0.08 
 Invention novelty max 3.58 3.67 2 4 0.08 
Convergent measures      
 Uses practicality 2.62 2.64 2.03 3 0.04 
 Invention practicality 3.15 3.21 1.79 3.86 0.06 
 RAT 0.59 0.62 0 1 0.04 
 Letters 0.61 0.71 0 1 0.05 
    
Table 2 
Intercorrelations between measures, collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2. 



















U fluency 0.50* 0.50* 0.37* 0.24* 0.26* -0.43* -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 
U novel mean  0.79* 0.31* 0.27* 0.29* -0.89* -0.02  0.01 -0.04 
U novel max   0.17* 0.25* 0.22* -0.66*  0.01  0.03 -0.12 
I fluency    0.09 0.46* -0.32*  0.00 -0.07 -0.06 
I novel mean     0.75* -0.23* -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 
I novel max       -0.28* -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 
U practicality         0.06 -0.06  0.00 
I practicality          0.14m  0.00 
RAT           0.21* 
m p < .10; * p < .05
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was an effect of room size on mean novelty, with participants in 
the large room, on average, creating more novel inventions (M 
= 2.9, SE = .10) than participants in the small room (M 
= 2.6, SE = .10), d = 0.76 [0.10, 1.41], F(1,41) = 6.2, p = .02. 
Similarly, there was an effect of max novelty, with the most 
novel inventions of participants in the large room being, on 
average, more novel (M = 3.8, SE = .10) than the most novel 
inventions of participants in the small room (M = 3.4, SE 
= .10), d = 0.76 [0.10, 1.41], F(1,41) = 6.2, p = .02. For practi-
cality, there was no effect of room size, with inventions from 
the large room condition about as practical (M = 3.2, SE 
= .08) as those from the small room (M = 3.1, SE = .08), d 
= 0.32 [-0.31, 0.96], F(1,41) = 1.1, p = .29.
RAT
There was no effect of room size, with participants in the 
large room having about the same mean proportion cor-
rect (M = .57, SE = .05) as participants in the small room (M 
= .60, SE = .05), d = -0.12 [-0.75, 0.51], F(1,41) = 0.2, p = .69.
Letter series
Participants in the large room generated a slightly higher 
proportion of correct responses (M = .65, SE = .07) than 
participants in the small room (M = .57, SE = .07), d = 0.22 
[-0.41, 0.85], but this difference was not statistically signifi-
cant, F(1,41) = .05, p = .48.
Perceived task difficulty
There was a marginal effect of room size on perceived dif-
ficulty for the uses task, with participants in the large room 
self-reporting slightly lower levels of difficulty (M = 4.1, SE 
= .36) compared to participants in the small room (M = 5.1, 
SE = .36), d = -0.53 [-1.15, 0.08], F(1,45) = 3.4, p = .07. For 
the invention task, there was a main effect of room size, with 
lower self-reported difficulty in the large (M = 5.2, SE = 0.3) 
vs. small room (M = 6.8, SE = 0.3), d = -1.16 [-1.81, -0.51], 
F(1,45) = 15.7, p = 0.00.
In contrast, for the RAT, participants in the large room 
self-reported about the same levels of perceived difficulty 
(M = 7.1, SE = .30) as participants in the small room (M 
= 7.4, SE = .29), d = -0.16 [-0.77, 0.43], F(1,45) = 0.34, p = .56. 
Similarly, for the letters task, participants in the large room 
self-reported about the same levels of perceived difficulty (M 
= 6.3, SE = .36) as participants in the small room (M = 5.9, SE 
= .36), d = 0.24 [-0.37, 0.84], F(1,45) = 0.65, p = .42.
Positive and negative affect
There was no effect of room size on positive affect, with par-
ticipants in the large room self-reporting about the same 
levels of positive affect (M = 27.6, SE = 1.5) as participants 
in the small room (M = 27.4, SE = 1.5), d = 0.04 [-0.59, 
0.68], F(1,41) = 0.02, p = .89. Similarly, there was no effect 
of room size on negative affect, with participants in the large 
room self-reporting about the same levels of negative affect (M 
= 12.3, SE = .47) as participants in the small room (M = 11.8, 
SE = .46), d = 0.22 [-0.41, 0.86], F(1,41) = 0.53, p = .47.
DIsCUssION
Experiment 1 yielded evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1 
(see Figure 5 for a summary of the observed effects). As pre-
dicted, participants’ performance was higher on the diver-
gent problem solving measures in the larger room than in the 
smaller room (e.g., uses fluency, uses novelty, invention nov-
elty). In contrast, we found only partial support for Hypothesis 
2, that is, that participants in the large rooms would perform 
worse on convergence measures than participants in the small 
rooms. Consistent with the hypothesis, we found that partic-
ipants in the larger room showed lower performance on the 
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the intercorrelations between participants’ problem solving task performance measures, collapsed 
across Experiments 1 and 2. In general, the correlations were in the expected directions (e.g., 
significant positive correlations between divergent measures; significant positive correlations 
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Descriptive statistics for experiment 1. 
  Mean Median Min Max SE 
Divergent measures      
 Uses fluency 22.07 21 7 42 1.32 
 Uses novelty mean 1.67 1.59 1 2.58 0.06 
 Uses novelty max 3.12 3 1 4 0.13 
 Invention fluency 5.07 5 2 9 0.29 
 Invention novelty mean 2.74 2.83 1.56 3.83 0.08 
 Invention novelty max 3.58 3.67 2 4 0.08 
Convergent measures      
 Uses practicality 2.62 2.64 2.03 3 0.04 
 Invention practicality 3.15 3.21 1.79 3.86 0.06 
 RAT 0.59 0.62 0 1 0.04 
 Letters 0.61 0.71 0 1 0.05 
    
Table 2 
Intercorrelations between measures, collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2. 



















U fluency 0.50* 0.50* 0.37* 0.24* 0.26* -0.43* -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 
U novel mean  0.79* 0.31* 0.27* 0.29* -0.89* -0.02  0.01 -0.04 
U novel max   0.17* 0.25* 0.22* -0.66*  0.01  0.03 -0.12 
I fluency    0.09 0.46* -0.32*  0.00 -0.07 -0.06 
I novel mean     0.75* -0.23* -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 
I novel max       -0.28* -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 
U practicality         0.06 -0.06  0.00 
I practicality          0.14m  0.00 
RAT           0.21* 
m p < .10; * p < .05
Table 2
Intercorrelations between measures, collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2.
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps  2016 | Volume 9
J. Chan & T. J. Nokes-Malach Situative Creativity
37
uses practicality measure. However, no differences were found 
across the two groups on invention practicality and perfor-
mance on the RAT and letter series task. In the general discus-
sion we discuss possible reasons for why we did not observe 
stronger negative effects of a large space on convergence mea-
sures. Taken together, these results show that the benefits of the 
larger room for divergent performance were not simply due to 
a general facilitation effect of being in the larger room; rather, 
there seems to be a specific effect of being in a larger room on 
the cognitive processes that enable divergent performance.
Analysis of the additional measures yielded additional 
insights. In support of Hypotheses 3, the perceived task dif-
ficulty results suggest that participants in the larger room not 
only performed better on the uses and invention tasks (in 
terms of divergent performance measures), but also found 
the task overall to be less cognitively taxing (compared to 
participants in the smaller rooms), suggesting that some 
of the performance benefits might be due to unconscious 
mechanisms (e.g., automatic attunement of semantic search 
patterns to search affordances in the physical environment). 
Further, analysis of the survey responses for PANAS suggests 
that the differences are not explained by positive boosts to 
affect in the larger room (or increased negative affect in the 
smaller room). This result is consistent with the direct prim-
ing hypothesis and not the concept activation account.
EXPERIMENT 2: REPlICATION AND EXTENsION
Given the novelty of our hypotheses, we conducted a second 
study to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 1. The 
focus of the extension is to ensure that the effects were not 
due to idiosyncrasies of the particular configurations of the 
large room or problem solving stimuli. To this end, we slightly 
altered the large room manipulation from Experiment 1 (par-
ticipants sat at the top of the auditorium rather than at the bot-
tom), and added a second new large room that had a lower 
ceiling height but was still spacious horizontally. To maximize 
statistical power, we treated them as a single condition in our 
analyses.2  We also changed the objects used for the uses task, 
as well as the categories and shapes used for the invention task.
METhODs
Participants
One hundred and nine undergraduates (61 females; ages 
18–31, average age 19) enrolled in Introduction to Psy-
chology at a large research university in the northeastern 
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between letter series and RAT measures; significant negative correlations between uses 
practicality and the divergent measures). However, the correlations are generally low, explaining 
small amounts of common variance, and some correlations are missing (e.g., no significant 
correlations between practicality and the letters series and RAT measures, and no significant 
correlations between invention practicality and any of the other measures). This suggests that the 
measures do n t neces arily primarily reflect the two constructs of divergence and convergence 
(as we had hypothesized). Therefore, we nalyze each measure separately. 
Alternative uses  
 There was an effect of room size on mean fluency, with participants in the large room 
generating more uses (M = 25.0, SE = 1.8) than participants in the small room (M = 19.3, SE = 
1.8), d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.03, 1.33], F(1,41) = 5.0, p = .03. There was also an effect of room 
size on mean novelty, with participants in the large room producing higher mean novelty with 
	
Figure 4. Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size in Experiment 1. Error 
bars are ±1 SE. 
igure 4
Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size in Experiment 1. Error bars are ±1 SE.
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showed lower performance on the uses practicality measure. However, no differences were found 
across the two groups on invention practicality and performance on the RAT and letter series 
task. In the general discussion we discuss possible reasons for why we did not observe stronger 
negative effects of a large space on convergence measures. Taken together, these results show 
that the benefits of the larger room for divergent performance were not simply due to a general 
facilitation effect of being in the larger room; rather, there seems to be a specific effect of being 
in a larger room on the cognitive processes that enable divergent performance.  
Analysis of the additional measures yielded additional insights. In support of Hypotheses 
3, the perceived task difficulty results suggest that participants in the larger room not only 
performed better on the uses and invention tasks (in terms of divergent performance measures), 
but also found the task overall to be less cognitively taxing (compared to participants in the 
smaller rooms), suggesting that some of the performance benefits might be due to unconscious 
mechanisms (e.g., automatic attunement of semantic search patterns to search affordances in the 
	
Figure 5. Summary of effects in Experiment 1. Error bars are 95% CIs. 
Figure 5
Summary of effects in Experiment 1. Error bars are 95% CIs.
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United States participated in this study. All participants were 
recruited through the university’s psychology subject pool, 
and were compensated with course credit.
Three participants (assigned to the large rooms) did not 
produce any valid responses to the invention task, and were 
dropped from all analyses, leaving us with 106 total partici-
pants in our final dataset.3
Materials
Room size manipulation. In this study, the “large” setting of our 
room size manipulation included two different rooms: 1) 
the same conference auditorium as in Experiment 1, with 
the only difference being that participants sat at the top of the 
room, rather than the bottom of the room, and 2) another 
conference room in the same building (see Figure 6). The 
dimensions of the new large room were approximately 15’ W 
× 30’ L × 8’ H. Other than the desk and chair the participants 
used, along with the other desks and chairs in the room, the 
room was empty. Note also that the lighting here is fluores-
cent, similar to the small rooms in both experiments.
The “small” room was another former office space in the 
same building that was emptied out for the experiment. 
The dimensions of the room were the same as in Experiment 
1, approximately 8’ W × 10’ L × 8’ H. As in Experiment 1, 
participants completed their tasks on a desk facing one of the 
walls. It was empty except for the desk and chair the partici-
pants used.
Problem-solving tasks. As in Experiment 1, participants com-
pleted the alternative uses, shape invention, RAT, and let-
ter series tasks. The only differences from Experiment 1 are 
with the stimuli for the alternative uses and shape invention 
tasks. The objects used for the alternative uses were “CUP” 
and “TABLE.” A different set of categories and shapes were 
randomly sampled for the invention task, using the same 
procedure as in Experiment 1. The new categories were 
“Transportation,” “Furniture,” and “Weapons,” and the new 
shapes were “rectangular block,”  “ring,” and “half-sphere” 
(see Figure 7).
Dependent measures
As in Experiment 1, we obtained measures of fluency and 
novelty for both the uses and invention tasks. Inter-rater reli-
ability was high for novelty scoring across both tasks, ICC(2,2) 
= .83 for uses novelty, and ICC(2,3) = .84 for invention nov-
elty. We then aggregated scores at the participant level into 
mean and max novelty. Also as in Experiment 1, we evaluated 
uses and inventions for practicality. Inter-rater reliability was 
high for uses practicality, ICC(2,2) = .82, and acceptable for 
invention practicality, ICC(2,4) = .67. We then aggregated 
scores into participant-level measures of mean uses and 
invention practicality. Both the RAT and letter series tasks 
were scored identically to Experiment 1 (i.e., percent correct).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that partic-
ipants did not complete the PANAS measurement at any point.
Design
This experiment had a between-subjects design. The inde-
pendent variable was room size, with two levels (large or 
small). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. 
In the final dataset, there were 68 participants in the large 
rooms and 38 participants in the small room.
REsUlTs
Descriptive statistics for all measures are shown in Table 3. 
Note that performance on all divergent measures (except 
for uses fluency) was significantly lower than that observed 
in Experiment 1. In contrast, performance on the practi-
cality measures for both the uses and invention tasks were 
Situative Creativity 26
Three participants (assigned to the large rooms) did not produce any vali  r sponses to 
the invention task, and were dropped from all analyses, leaving us with 106 total participants in 
our final dataset.3 
 
Materials 
Room size manipulation. In this study, the “large” setting of our room size manipulation 
included two different rooms: 1) the same conference auditorium as in Experiment 1, with the 
only difference being that participants sat at the top of the room, rather than the bottom of the 
room, and 2) another conference room in the same building (see Fig. 6). The dimensions of the 
new large room were approximately 15′ × 30′ × 8′. Other than the desk and chair the participants 
used, along with the other desks and chairs in the room, the room was empty. Note also that the 
lighting here is fluorescent, similar to the small rooms in both experiments. 
The “small” room was another former office space in the same building that was emptied 
																																																								
3 Results are the same with partial data from these participants included. 
Figure 6. Picture of new large room in Experiment 2. Figure 6
Picture of new large room in Experiment 2.
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out for the experiment. The dimensions of the room were the same as in Experiment 1, i.e., 
approximately 8′ W × 10′ L × 8′ H. As in Experiment 1, participants completed their tasks on a 
desk facing one of the walls. It was empty except for the desk and chair the participants used. 
Problem-solving tasks. As in Experiment 1, participants completed the alternative uses, 
shape invention, RAT, and letter series tasks. The only differences from Exp riment 1 are with 
the stimuli for the alter ative uses and shape invention tasks. The objects used for the alternative 
uses were “CUP” and “TABLE.” A different set of categories and shapes were randomly sampled 
for the invention task, using the same procedure as in Experiment 1. The new categories were 
“Transportation,” “Furniture,” and “Weapons,” and the new shapes were “rectangular block,”  
“ring,” and “half-sphere” (see Fig. 7). 
 
Dependent measures 
As in Experiment 1, we obtained measures of fluency and novelty for both the uses and 
invention tasks. Inter-rater reliability was high for novelty scoring across both tasks, ICC(2,2) = 
.83 for uses novelty, and ICC(2,3) = .84 for invention novelty. We then aggregated scores at the 
participant level into mean and max ovelty. Also as in Experiment 1, we evaluated uses and 
inventions for practicality. Inter-rater reliability was high for uses practicality, ICC(2,2) = .82, 
and acceptable for invention practicality, ICC(2,4) = .67. We then aggregated scores into 
		
Figure 7. Shapes for invention task in Experiment 2. 
Figure 7
Shapes for invention task in Experiment 2.
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significantly higher than in Experiment 1. However, letters 
performance was also lower than in Experiment 1. We return 
to this issue in the discussion when interpreting the relation-
ship between the results across the two experiments.
Alternative uses
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no effect of room size 
on mean fluency, F(1,1 04) = 0.4, p = .53, with participants in 
the large rooms generating about the same number of uses (M 
= 20.3, SE = 0.9) as participants in the small room (M 
= 19.3, SE = 1.2), d = 0.13 [-0.28, 0.54]. In contrast, similar 
to Experiment 1, mean trends for novelty of uses were in 
the hypothesized direction. However, the mean differences 
did not reach statistical significance. Mean novelty of uses 
was nonsignificantly higher in the large room (M = 1.4, SE 
= 0.0) compared to the small room (M = 1.3, SE = 0.0), d 
= 0.34 [-0.07, 0.75], F(1,104) = 2.8, p = .10 (Fig. 8, left panel). 
Max novelty was marginally higher in the large rooms (M 
= 2.9, SE = 0.1) compared to the small room (M = 2.6, SE 
= 0.1), d = 0.37 [-0.03, 0.78], F(1,104) = 3.4, p = .07 (Fig. 8, 
middle panel).
Similar to Experiment 1, there was an effect of room size 
on uses practicality, F(1,104) = 4.1, p = .04, with participants 
in the larger rooms generating less practical uses (M = 2.8, 
SE = 0.01) than participants in the small room (M = 2.9, SE 
= 0.02), d = -0.41 [-0.82, 0.00] (Fig 8, right panel).
Shape invention
There was no effect of room size on mean fluency, F(1,104) 
= 0.9, p = .36, with participants in the large room generating 
about the same number of inventions (M = 3.4, SE = 0.3) as 
participants in the small room (M = 3.8, SE = 0.3), d = -0.19 
[-0.59, 0.22]. In contrast to Experiment 1, there were no reli-
able effects of room size on novelty of inventions: Participants 
in the larger rooms had similar mean novelty scores (M = 2.5, 
SE = 0.1) as participants in the small room (M = 2.5, SE = 0.1), 
d = 0.14 [-0.26, 0.55], F(1,104) = 0.5, p = .49. Similarly, partici-
pants in the larger rooms achieved about the same max novelty 
scores (M = 3.2, SE = 0.1) as participants in the small room (M 
= 3.1, SE = 0.1), d = 0.06 [-0.35, 0.46], F(1,104) = 0.1, p = 0.79.
There was no effect of room size on invention practical-
ity, with participants in the large room generating inventions 
that were about as practical (M = 3.4, SE = 0.1) as partici-
pants in the small room (M = 3.5, SE = 0.1), d = -0.15 [-0.56, 
0.25], F(1,104) = 0.6, p = .46.
RAT
There was no effect of room size, F(1,104) = 0.02, p = .90. 
Participants in the larger rooms had about the same mean 
proportion correct (M = .56, SE = .03) as participants in the 
small room (M = .55, SE = .04), d = 0.03 [-0.37, 0.43].
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 Alternative uses 
 In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no effect of room size on mean fluency, F(1,1
04) = 0.4, p = .53, with participants in the large rooms generating about the same number of uses 
(M = 20.3, SE = 0.9) as participants in the small room (M = 19.3, SE = 1.2), d = 0.13 [-0.28, 
0.54]. In contrast, similar to Experiment 1, mean trends for novelty of uses were in the 
hypothesized direction. However, the mean differences did not reach statistical significance. 
Mean novelty of uses was nonsignificantly higher in the large room (M = 1.4, SE = 0.0)
compared to the small room (M = 1.3, SE = 0.0), d = 0.34 [-0.07, 0.75], F(1,104) = 2.8, p = .10
(Fig. 8, left panel). Max novelty was m rginally higher in the large rooms (M = 2.9, SE = 0.1)
compared to the small room (M = 2.6, SE = 0.1), d = 0.37 [-0.03, 0.78], F(1,104) = 3.4, p = .07
(Fig. 8, middle panel). 
 Similar to Experiment 1, there was an effect of room size on uses practicality, F(1,104)
= 4.1, p = .04, with participants in the larger rooms generating less practical uses (M = 2.8, SE = 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for experiment 2. 
  Mean Median Min Max SE 
 Uses fluency 19.93 19 6 37 0.69 
 Uses novelty mean  1.38 V 1.35 1 2.12 0.02 
 Uses novelty max  2.77 V 3 1 4 0.08 
 Invention fluency  3.51 V 3 1 13 0.21 
 Invention novelty mean  2.51 V 2.52 1.25 3.78 0.05 
 Invention novelty max  3.17 V 3.33 1.67 4 0.07 
 Uses practicality  2.83 ^ 2.86 2.47 3 0.01 
 Invention practicality  3.43 ^ 3.50 1.5 4.33 0.04 
 RAT  0.56 0.55 0 1 0.02 
 Letters  0.50 V 0.52 0 0.78 0.01 
V p < .05 lower than Experiment 1; ^ p < .05 higher than Experiment 1. 
    
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 2.
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0.01) than participants in the small room (M = 2.9, SE = 0.02), d = -0.41 [-0.82, 0.00] (Fig 8, 
right panel). 
Shape invention 
 There was no effect of room size on mean fluency, F(1,104) = 0.9, p = .36, with 
participants in the large room generating about the same number of inventions (M = 3.4, SE = 
0.3) as participants in the small room (M = 3.8, SE = 0.3), d = -0.19 [-0.59, 0.22]. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, there were no reliable effects of room size on novelty of inventions: Participants 
in the larger rooms had similar mean novelty scores (M = 2.5, SE = 0.1) as participants in the 
small room (M = 2.5, SE = 0.1), d = 0.14 [-0.26, 0.55], F(1,104) = 0.5, p = .49. Similarly, 
participants in the larger rooms achieved about the same max novelty scores (M = 3.2, SE = 0.1)
as participants in the small room (M = 3.1, SE = 0.1), d = 0.06 [-0.35, 0.46], F(1,104) = 0.1, p = 
0.79.
	
Figure 8. Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size in Experiment 2. Error 
bars are ±1 SE. 
Figure 8
Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size in Experiment 2. Error bars are ±1 SE.
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Letter series
There was no effect of room size, F(1,104) = 0.07, p = .79. 
Participants in the larger rooms had about the same mean 
proportion correct (M = .50, SE = .02) as participants in the 
small room (M = .50, SE = .02), d = -0.05 [-0.46, 0.35].
Perceived task difficulty
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no effect of room size 
on perceived difficulty for the uses task, F(1,104) = 0.0, p 
= .98. Participants in the larger rooms self-reported the same 
levels of cognitive load (M = 5.1, SE = .18) as participants in 
the small room (M = 5.1, SE = .24), d = -0.00 [-0.40, 0.41]. 
Similarly, for the invention task, participants self-reported 
the same level of difficulty in the large (M = 5.9, SE = 0.21) 
and small rooms (M = 5.9, SE = 0.28), d = -0.00 [–0.41, 0.40], 
F(1,104) = 0.0, p = 0.98.
Results were the same as Experiment 1 for the RAT and 
letters tasks. For the RAT, perceived difficulty was about the 
same in the large (M = 7.5, SE = 0.15) and small rooms (M 
= 7.3, SE = 0.20), d = 0.13 [-0.28, 0.53], F(1,104) = 0.4, p = 0.53. 
Similarly, perceived difficulty of the letters task was the same 
in the large (M = 0.50, SE = 0.02) and small rooms (M = 0.50, 
SE = 0.02), d = -0.05 [-0.46, 0.35], F(1,104) = 0.1, p = 0.79.
DIsCUssION
In Experiment 2, we sought to replicate and extend the 
findings from Experiment 1. See Figure 8 for a summary 
of the effects. We observed very similar patterns of effects 
for the alternative uses, RAT, and letter series tasks. Similar 
to Experiment 1, novelty (both mean and max) of uses was 
higher in the larger vs. small room, although the effect size 
was substantially smaller than Experiment 1 (approximately 
half the size). These trends are in the predicted direction of 
Hypothesis 1, and consistent with both the direct priming 
and concept activation accounts. Overall performance on 
the divergent measures were worse in both conditions in this 
experiment compared to Experiment 1, which may suggest 
floor effects. In the general discussion we further consider 
possible reasons for the partial replication.
Partial support and replication was found for Hypothesis 
2, with participants in the large room showing worse perfor-
mance on the practicality measure of the alternative uses task 
compared to those in the small room. Also similar to Experi-
ment 1, there was no effect of room size on the RAT or letter 
series task. However, perceived difficulty patterns did not rep-
licate from Experiment 1. The failure to replicate the difference 
in perceived difficulty means that findings do not support the 
direct priming hypothesis more so than the concept activation 
account. In sum, we observed a partial replication of the results 
in Experiment 1 (mainly with novelty and practicality of uses).
GENERAl DIsCUssION
In this paper, we sought to explore the potential cognitive 
bases of the spatial metaphor that initial exploration of a 
creative space should be “broad.” Across two experiments, 
we tested the hypothesis that larger physical spaces facilitate 
divergent, but not convergent, processes in problem-solving. 
Experiment 1 provided support for Hypothesis 1 and 2, and 
Experiment 2 partially replicated the findings. Smaller room 
sizes facilitated the generation of more practical uses of 
everyday objects across both experiments. Larger room sizes 
facilitated the generation of more novel uses of everyday 
objects (specifically mean and max novelty) in Experiment 
1; although the same trends were seen in Experiment 2, the 
effects did not reach significance.
As noted in our discussion of the descriptive statistics in 
Experiment 2, there was a significant drop in performance 
across many of our measures from Experiment 1, suggest-
ing that there may have been important differences in the 
two samples. One potential explanation is that Experiment 
2 participants were exclusively undergraduate students par-
ticipating for course credit, whereas Experiment 1 partici-
pants were paid volunteers and included a wider range of 
demographics (not just undergraduate students). Reduced 
motivation may have led to floor effects, potentially reducing 
the sensitivity of our measures. Motivation differences might 
have been especially important since we did not provide 
direct instructions to “be creative” in either experiment. For 
example, while the mean rated novelty of alternative uses was 
close to “not at all novel” across both experiments, the mean 
and variability was higher in Experiment 1 (M = 1.67, SD 
= 0.42) compared to Experiment 2 (M = 1.38, SD = 0.24). The 
generally low novelty scores (and high practicality scores) 
with relatively low variance suggest that participants were 
in general defaulting to more convergent processing. This 
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7.3, SE = 0.20), d = 0.13 [-0.28, 0.53], F(1,104) = 0.4, p = 0.53. Similarly, perceived difficulty 
of the letters task was the same in the large (M = 0.50, SE = 0.02) and small rooms (M = 0.50, SE
= 0.02), d = -0.05 [-0.46, 0.35], F(1,104) = 0.1, p = 0.79.
Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, we sought to replicate and extend the findings from Experiment 1. See 
Figure 8 for a summary of the effects. We observed very similar patterns of effects for the 
alternative uses, RAT, and letter series tasks. Similar to Experiment 1, novelty (both mean and 
max) of uses was higher in the larger vs. small room, although the effect size was substantially 
smaller than Experiment 1 (approximately half the size). These trends are in the predicted 
direction of Hypothesis 1, and consistent with both the direct priming and concept activation 
accounts. Overall performance on the divergent measures were worse in both conditions in this 
experiment compared to Experiment 1, which may suggest floor effects. In the general 
	
Figure 9. Summary of effects in Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% CIs. Figure 9
Summary of effects in Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% CIs.
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observation is consistent with prior research on the “path 
of least resistance” in creative production (Ward, 1994), and 
other work that has shown that instructions to “be creative” 
can yield substantial improvements to creative output (Nus-
baum, Silvia, & Beaty, 2014): People generally need to expend 
cognitive effort to overcome initial biases toward less cre-
ative responses (e.g., using cognitive control to inhibit more 
accessible but less creative responses; Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, 
Jauk, & Benedek, 2014). In light of this, it may be useful to 
think of these results as describing the effects of room size 
on “default” problem solving (i.e., when participants are not 
necessarily actively trying to be creative in their responses).
We believe that pooling the data from the two experi-
ments provides the clearest picture (e.g., robust across a 
wide range of participants and problem solving stimuli) of 
whether there is a relationship between room size and diver-
gent and convergent problem solving processes. The pooled 
data indicate reliable evidence that larger physical spaces 
facilitate novelty and hinder practicality of solutions on the 
alternative uses task (see Figure 9). In the pooled data, mean 
novelty of uses is higher in the larger rooms (M = 1.5, SE 
= 0.03) compared to the small rooms (M = 1.4, SE = 0.04), 
d = 0.34 [0.01, 0.67], F(1,147) = 4.13, p = .04. Similarly, max 
novelty of uses is higher in the larger rooms (M = 3.0, SE 
= 0.09) compared to the small rooms (M = 2.7, SE = 0.11), d 
= 0.37 [0.04, 0.71], F(1,147) = 5.13, p = .03. In contrast, mean 
practicality of uses was lower in the larger rooms (M = 2.7, 
SE = 0.02) compared to the small rooms (M = 2.8, SE = 0.02), 
d = -0.38 [-0.71, -0.04], F(1,147) = 5.11, p = .03.
Our primary goal in this study is to document a psycholog-
ical phenomenon: We provide an initial test of whether there 
is an association between room size and divergent problem 
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We believe that pooling the data from the two experiments provides the clearest picture 
(e.g., robust across a wide range of participants and problem solving stimuli) of whether there is 
a relationship between room size and divergent and convergent problem solving processes. The 
pooled data indicate reliable evidence that larger physical spaces facilitate novelty and hinder 
practicality of solutions on the alternative uses task (see Figure 9). In the pooled data, mean 
novelty of uses is higher in the larger rooms (M = 1.5, SE = 0.03) compared to the small rooms 
(M = 1.4, SE = 0.04), d = 0.34 [0.01, 0.67], F(1,147) = 4.13, p = .04. Similarly, max novelty of 
uses is higher in the larger rooms (M = 3.0, SE = 0.09) compared to the small rooms (M = 2.7, 
SE = 0.11), d = 0.37 [0.04, 0.71], F(1,147) = 5.13, p = .03. In contrast, mean practicality of uses 
was lower in the larger rooms (M = 2.7, SE = 0.02) compared to the small rooms (M = 2.8, SE =
0.02), d = -0.38 [-0.71, -0.04], F(1,147) = 5.11, p = .03. 
Our primary goal in this study is to document a psychological phenomenon: We provide 
an initial test of whether there is an association between room size and divergent problem solving 
Figure 10. Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size, pooled across 
experiments. Error bars are ±1 SE. 
solving performance. While this effect appears to be relatively 
small and may depend on having sufficiently motivated par-
ticipants, some aspects of our results provide hints for future 
theoretical refinement. While our results from the problem 
solving measures (and non-replication of the hypothesized 
perceived task difficulty results from Experiment 1 to Experi-
ment 2) are consistent with both a direct priming explanation 
(Hills, 2006; Hills et al., 2008, 2012), as well as the concept 
activation explanation (Meyers-Levy & Zhu, 2007), the affect 
results in Experiment 1 help to partially arbitrate between 
the explanations. The lack of effect on positive/negative affect 
is more consistent with a direct priming explanation, since 
concepts of “freedom” or “openness” are expected to engen-
der more positive affect, whereas attunement to resource 
distribution patterns are not. We therefore suggest that, to 
the extent that this effect proves reliable, it may be a conse-
quence of automatic attunement of semantic search patterns 
to search affordances in the physical environment. That is, 
people may be responding to the physical search affordances 
of the physical environment by defocusing their attention to 
enable broader search in semantic memory, shifting from a 
tight focus on a few highly relevant responses to consider-
ing more semantically distant and varied responses. However, 
alternative explanations are possible: For example, it is possi-
ble that the small room reminded people of traditional office 
environments, which may have invoked a “work schema” that 
primed more focused attention, impairing divergent think-
ing. Further investigations are necessary to tease apart the 
psychological underpinnings of this effect.
Although we intended the letter series task and RAT to be 
measures of convergent problem solving processes based on 
the nature of the response required (many = divergent, single 
Figure 10
Novelty and practicality of alternative uses by room size, pooled across experiments. Error bars are ±1 SE.
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= convergent), in hindsight, it is probably best to consider both 
the RAT and the letter series task as a more even mix of diver-
gent and convergent processes than the fluency and novelty 
measures for the uses and invention tasks (which quite cleanly 
measure divergent processes). For example, in the RAT, one 
might first search broadly for possible meanings (strong and 
weak associates) of the target words and then only later con-
verge on the common target that links across all three. Similarly, 
the letter series task may first require divergent search for sev-
eral possible patterns before converging on the single, correct 
pattern to extrapolate. The mixture of both divergent and con-
vergent processes in the letter series task and RAT might explain 
why we did not find a harmful effect of large rooms on letter 
series and RAT performance, and why we only found a harmful 
effect of large rooms on practicality of uses (which turned out 
empirically to be our cleanest measures of convergent processes, 
based on the intercorrelations between measures). 
Our data have broader implications for the psychology of 
creative problem solving. For example, our observed strong 
negative correlations between novelty and practicality of 
uses corroborate prior arguments that originality and prac-
ticality in creative thought are cognitively at odds with each 
other (Goldenberg et al., 2013). Our results also have impli-
cations for how we should think about the RAT as a measure 
of creativity. In this study, we departed from a number of 
prior studies that have examined the divergent aspects of the 
RAT, for example, studying the relationship between defo-
cused attention and RAT performance (Aiello et al., 2012; 
Haarmann et al., 2012). However, the differing patterns of 
results and lack of correlation between the RAT and diver-
gent problem solving measures for the invention and uses 
task suggest that the RAT may involve more convergence 
than is typically described. Noting these findings might lead 
to more fruitful theoretical examinations of the relation-
ship between the RAT and problem solving and creativity. 
For example, Goel, Eimontaite, Goel, and Schindler (2015) 
recently argued that insight problems (such as the RAT) are 
a subset of well-structured problems, while divergent prob-
lem solving tasks (such as the alternative uses and invention 
tasks) are a subset of ill-structured problems. Our results also 
echo a number of recent studies that have demonstrated the 
psychological separability of divergent and convergent prob-
lem solving processes (Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Col-
zato et al., 2012; Hommel, Colzato, Fischer, & Christoffels, 
2011; Oppezzo & Schwartz, 2014; Radel et al., 2015). We join 
these more nuanced arguments to call for more careful anal-
yses of the components of creative performance (e.g., sepa-
rating divergent vs. convergent processes) in future research 
on creativity.
NOTEs
1 Results are the same with partial data from these partici-
pants included.
2 There were no statistical differences between participants in 
the two large rooms on any of the measures.
3 Results are the same with partial data from these partici-
pants included.
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APPENDIX B: FULL LIST OF ITEMS FOR LETTER SERIES TASK 
1. aaabbbcccdd __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
2. atbataatbat __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
3. abmcdmefmghm __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
4. defgefghfghi __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
5. qxapxbqxa __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
6. aduacuaeuabuafua __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
7. mabmbcmcdm __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
8. urtustuttu __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
9. abyabxabwab __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
10. rscdstdetuef __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
11. npaoqapraqsa __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
12. wxaxybyzczadab __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
13. jkqrklrslmst __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
14. pononmnmlmlk __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
15. lmzmlymnx __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
16. efsferfgq __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
17. cdqdcpdeo __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
18. ijwjivjku __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
